Accused Fort Hood Shooter to Have Military Trial, Will Face Death Penalty

Fox News

DEVELOPING: The Army psychiatrist  charged in the deadly Fort  Hood rampage in Texas will be court-martialed and face the death penalty,  Fox News confirms.

Maj. Nidal Hasan is charged with 13 counts of  premeditated murder and 32 counts of attempted premeditated murder in the  November 2009 shooting spree at the Texas Army post.

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Witnesses say Fort Hood gunman kept firing outside

Yahoo News

FORT HOOD, Texas – As dozens of soldiers lay dead or bleeding in a Fort Hood processing center last year, a gunman went outside and continued firing as others ran to nearby buildings, hid behind cars or carried wounded comrades to safety, witnesses told a military court Friday.

Chief Warrant Officer II Christopher Royal said he ran out of the center where soldiers were preparing to deploy after he heard gunshots and saw the shooter, but then decided to go back and try to stop the rampage, because “I told myself I could not let him get away with it.”

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Soldier says ordered to delete Fort Hood videos

Yahoo News

FORT HOOD, Texas – A soldier who recorded the terror of last year’s deadly shooting rampage in Fort Hood using his cell phone was ordered by an officer to delete both videos, a military court heard Friday.

Under cross examination, Pfc. Lance Aviles told an Article 32 hearing that his noncommissioned officer ordered him to destroy the two videos on Nov. 5, the same day a gunman unleashed a volley of bullets inside a processing center at the Texas Army post.

The footage could have been used as evidence at the military hearing to decide if Maj. Nidal Hasan should stand trial in the shootings. The 40-year-old American-born Muslim has been charged with 13 counts of premeditated murder and 32 counts of attempted premeditated murder.

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Here’s some History for you Mr. Obama

Socialism is not the Answer

1 Dragon


You know when I went to school years ago, I remember being in History Class. We were taught about Christopher Columbus and his trip in search of the New World. He had three ships, the Nina, the Pinta, and the Santa Maria. I don’t remember the Nina, the Pinta and the Mohammad Ali. I don’t remember any Muslim signing the Constitution or the Bill or Rights. I do remember Muslims siding with Germany during WWII. I remember the Assassination of Robert Kennedy by Sirhan Sirhan. I remember the 1972 Olympics when Muslim terrorist took 11 Israelis hostage and killed all of them. I remember in 1979, the Iran hostage crisis at the US Embassy in Tehran, where 66 Americans were taken hostage. I remember in 1983 Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility for the bombing of a US Marine Barracks in Lebanon, killing 299 American and French Servicemen.

Is this the kind of history that Mr. Obama spoke of when he said that Muslims have contributed to American history? How is it that according to a resent story posted on this site, that the killings at Ft Hood by Maj. Hasan, a Muslim, is now regarded as “work place violence”, when Maj. Hasan was heard praising Allah before killing 13 Americans.

How are honor killings, according to Shariah Law considered just in this country? Is it not still murder? And since when do we have a different set of laws for one group of people? Shariah Law is not part of America, it is part of an evil culture that still believe they are living in the 7thCentury.

Seventy percent of Americans are against the Mosque at Ground Zero.

Why is it not 100%

Ft. Hood suspect was Army dilemma

Boston.com

WASHINGTON – Army superiors were warned about the radicalization of Major Nidal Malik Hasan years before he allegedly massacred 13 soldiers at Fort Hood, Texas, but did not act in part because they valued the rare diversity of having a Muslim psychiatrist, military investigators wrote in previously undisclosed reports.

An obvious “problem child’’ spouting extremist views, Hasan made numerous statements that were not protected by the First Amendment and were grounds for discharge by violating his military oath, investigators found.

Examples of Hasan’s radical behavior have previously been disclosed in press accounts based on interviews with unnamed Army officials, including his defense of suicide bombings and assertions that Islamic law took priority over his allegiance to the United States.

But the Pentagon’s careful documentation of individual episodes dating back to 2005 and the subsequent inaction of his superiors have not been made public before.

The Globe was permitted to review the Army’s more complete findings on the condition that it not name supervisory officers who did not act, some of whom are facing possible disciplinary action.

In searching for explanations for why superiors did not move to revoke Hasan’s security clearances or expel him from the Army, the report portrays colleagues and superiors as possibly reluctant to lose one of the Army’s few Muslim mental health specialists.

The report concludes that because the Army had attracted only one Muslim psychiatrist in addition to Hasan since 2001, “it is possible some were afraid’’ of losing such diversity “and thus were willing to overlook Hasan’s deficiencies as an officer.’’

“Several of his supervisors explicitly mentioned Hasan’s potential to inform our understanding of Islamic culture and how it relates to the current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan,’’ the investigators found.

In one classroom incident not previously described by the Army – which parallels another episode around the same time that has received press attention – Hasan gave a presentation in August 2007 titled “Is the War on Terrorism a War on Islam: An Islamic Perspective.’’

But the presentation was “shut down’’ by the instructor because Hasan appeared to be defending terrorism. Witnesses told investigators that Hasan became visibly upset as a result.

“The students reported his statements to superior officers, who took no action on the basis that Major Hasan’s statements were protected by the First Amendment,’’ the investigation found. “They did not counsel Hasan and consider administrative action, even though not all protected speech is compatible with continued military service.’’

It added: “Soldiers have rights under the First Amendment, but they are not the same rights as civilians. . . . [T]hese statements violated the Army . . . standard to hold a security clearance.’’

Hasan, 39, allegedly opened fire on fellow soldiers Nov. 5 at the Texas base, killing 13 and wounding 32 others. If convicted by a military court, he could face the death penalty.Continued..

Major Hasan and the Ideological Blinders

American Thinker

By Walid Phares

Major Nidal Hasan was not flagged because Washington has disarmed its own analysts with ideological blinders. The Pentagon’s review of the act of terrorism committed at Fort Hood deserves national attention regarding not only its important conclusions, but also what it missed in terms of analysis.

Jihadi Penetration: Part of a War
As announced by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, the report “reveals serious ‘shortcomings’ in the military’s ability to stop foreign extremists from trying to use America’s own soldiers against the United States.” The Pentagon’s review of the Fort Hood massacre stated that “serious shortcomings” were found in “the military’s ability to stop foreign extremists from trying to use its own soldiers against the United States.” The first question that comes to mind is whether the issue is about “shortcomings,” as described by the Pentagon, or about “systemic failures,” as announced by President Obama in his evaluation of the Christmas Day terror act. For as underlined by the Department of Defense in the case of Major Hasan, these failures were about the military’s ability to “stop foreign terrorists from using American soldiers against the United States.”

Such a statement is extremely important, as it finally informs the public that the U.S. personnel roster is indeed being infiltrated and recruited by foreign jihadists, who are described politically by the administration as “extremists.” Hence, the first logical conclusion from that finding is that jihadi networks are performing acts of war (and thus of terrorism) against U.S. defense assets and personnel in the homeland. This warrants the reevaluation of the conflict and a re-upgrading of it to a state of war, even though it would still need to be determined “with whom.”
Self-Radicalization
Secretary Gates said that “military supervisors are not properly focused on the threat posed by self-radicalization and need to better understand the behavioral warning signs.” He added that “extremists are changing their tactics in an attempt to hit the United States.” He then concluded that the Fort Hood massacre “reveals shortcomings in the way the department is prepared to defend against threats posed by external influences operating on members of our military community. … We have not done enough to adapt to the evolving domestic internal security threat to American troops and military facilities.”
The bottom line of the Department of Defense report is, as I relentlessly argued before and since Hasan’s shootings, that the U.S. military and intelligence lack the capability of detecting radicalization, should it be “self”-developed or activated from overseas. American analysts are not able to “detect” radicalization from where it is generated. In my last three books and dozens of briefings and testimonies to legislative and executive forums, I underlined the crucial importance of identifying the ideology behind radicalization. The latter is produced by a set of ideas assembled in a doctrinal package.

Unfortunately, the Bush and Obama administrations were both poorly advised by their experts. They were told, wrongly, that if they try to identify a “doctrine,” then they will be meddling with a religion. Academic and cultural advisers of the various U.S. agencies and offices (the majority of them, at least) failed their government by triggering a fear of theological entanglement. To the surprise of our Arab and Muslim allies in the region, who know how to detect the jihadist narrative, Washington disarmed its own analysts when bureaucrats of the last two years banned references to the very ideological indicators that could enable our analysts to detect the radicalization threat.

And it is not about “extreme religious views” as much as it is about an ideology. If Arabs and Muslims can identify it in the Middle East, why can’t Americans also? It is simply because jihadi propaganda has already penetrated our advising body and fooled many of our decision-makers into dropping the ideological parameters.


Hence, stunningly, Major Hasan, who fully displayed the narrative of jihadism, was not spotted as a jihadist. The report tried to blame his colleagues and other superiors for failing to find him “suspicious enough” and thus for causing a shortcoming. I disagree: What allowed Hasan to move undetected was a bureaucratic memo issued under both administrations, and made into policy last summer, ordering the members of the public service not to look at ideology or refer to words that can detect it. We did it to ourselves.

The Strategic Threat Ahead
The report raises “serious questions” about whether the military is prepared for similar attacks, particularly “multiple, simultaneous incidents.” In my book, Future Jihad: Terrorist Strategies against America, published half a decade ago, I sternly warned about the strategic determination of jihadists, al-Qaeda and beyond, to target the U.S. homeland — not just in terms of terrorizing the public, but in the framework of a chain of strikes widening gradually until it would evolve to coordinated, simultaneous attacks. In 2006-2007, I served on the then Task Force on Future Terrorism of the Department of Homeland Security and developed an analysis clearly showing the path to come. My briefings to several entities and agencies in the defense sector clearly argued that implanting, growing, and triggering homegrown jihadists to strike at U.S. national security is at the heart of the enemy’s strategy. I even projected the existence of a “war room” that directs these operations; Imam al-Awlaki’s example of multiple operatives’ coordination is only a small fragment of what it would be like.

In facing this mushrooming threat, not only do we lack a detection capacity to counter it, but we have been induced in error to adopt policies opposite to those suitable to our national defense. The misleading advice that the U.S. government relied on is deeply responsible for the failure to stop and counter radicalization. The report, although a step in the right direction, has troubling shortcomings:
A. It claims that “fixation on religion” is a missing indicator. This means that if Muslims insist on praying or Catholics refrain from eating meat on Fridays during Lent, this could be a lead to radicalization. Obviously, it is a dead end, for the indicator is the substance of the fixation, not the mere fact of religiosity. One statement of commitment to jihad is by far more important than fasting during the whole month of Ramadan. It is not theology but ideology, even though many writers in town insist on merging both based on their readings of text. I offer our government an easier way to detect the threat without venturing into unnavigable religious debates or unnecessarily apologizing for one or another particular faith.
B. The report describes Hasan as “an odd duck and a loner who was passed along from office to office and job to job despite professional failings that included missed or failed exams and physical fitness requirements.” Nice shot, but it leads nowhere, for the other potential Hasans amongst us aren’t all necessarily odd, failed students, and physically unfit. The next jihadists could be sharp, professional, and extremely social. It all depends on what the “War Room” is going to surprise us with. Medical doctors in Britain, rich young men from Nigeria, or converted farmers from North Carolina aren’t all in one profile basket. So let’s stop looking for framing “profiles” and start detecting ideology.
C. The report calls on the Defense Department “to fully staff those teams of investigators, analysts, linguists and others so the Pentagon can quickly see information collected across government agencies about potential links between troops and terrorist or extremist groups.” This is a long-awaited initiative, short of creating further catastrophes by staffing our bureaucracies with more cultural advisers who would further mislead our leaders and worsen the fledgling counter-ideology sectors already in place. I am making the bold statement that our problem is precisely that the expertise we sought over the past eight years is the reason for our inability to detect radicalization. Hence I would recommend an additional inquiry into our own specialization body before we re-contract it to lead the war of ideas.
The beef is there. Everything else is dressing